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BOOK REVIEW
TRUTH AND LEGITIMACY IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCESS
CHRISTOPHER A. BRACEY'
William Pizzi, TRLIAis WIHOUT TRUTH (New York University
Press, 1999) 254 pp.
Modem constitutional criminal procedure-specifically,
the elaborate regime of rights and procedural safeguards for
criminal suspects and defendants-has received a great deal of
attention and scrutiny over the past decade. A new perspective
on the criminal process, premised on the belief that the social
and political conditions that necessitated liberal reform of the
criminal process no longer exist, or that the normative structure
that protects these reformist measures from erosion has been
drained of its vitality, is quickly gaining currency in both the
theoretical halls of academe and the pragmatic realm of mu-
nicipal governments. This new perspective threatens to render
serious talk about the need to protect the rights of the accused
politically and culturally passe. If the reforms of the 1960s and
1970s constituted a revolution in criminal procedure, the cur-
rent climate reflects a powerful and sustained counter-
insurgency.
The touchstone of this new perspective is an abiding belief
that "[t]he days of needing close judicial supervision to guard
against use of the criminal process to discriminate against the
. Visiting Assistant Professor, Northwestern School of Law. B.S. 1992, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill;J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School.
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politically powerless are over."' The leading proponents of this
view-University of Chicago law professors Tracey Meares and
Dan Kahan-contend that close judicial scrutiny of police dis-
cretion and related aspects of the criminal process is no longer
necessary because minorities now possess sufficient political
status to protect themselves from the ill-effects of pernicious po-
lice practices.! Similarly, Harvard University law professor Ran-
dall Kennedy, in an effort to "free [himself] of reflexive
obedience to familiar signals,"0 has argued that criminal law en-
forcement policy that disproportionately affects African-
American suspects and defendants may be justified as a "public
good" from the perspective of law-abiding African-Americans,
who are statistically more often victims of crimes committed by
African-Americans.4 Other scholars have offered similar cri-
tiques of the modern criminal process that build on this imme-
diate theme.5
The message sent by proponents of this new perspective is
unmistakably clear: the criminal process in its present for, and
especially the regime of procedural safeguards intended to pro-
tect the interests of minority and indigent defendants, is tragi-
cally out-moded-a procedural relic reflective of and tailored to
social circumstances of a by-gone era. The legal doctrines un-
derlying the "modem" regime that once served a noble purpose
have simply outlived their usefulness. The image of the crimi-
nal process advanced is that of a regime rendered anachronistic
by the passage of time-one that is now failing us.
William Pizzi's Trials Without Truth provides an interesting
variation on this increasingly familiar theme. A comparative
criminal proceduralist by trade, Professor Pizzi demonstrates
the extent to which our criminal process purportedly fails us by
'David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal
Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. LJ. 1059, 1061 (1999).
' Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86
GEO. L.J. 1153, 1184 (1998).
-RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE CIuME AND =iI LAw x (1998).
4 See id. at 69-167; Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimina-
tion:A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (1994).
' See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places:
Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 551,562 (1997).
[Vol. 90
BOOKREVIEW
comparing our trial system with the trial systems of other West-
ern, industrialized countries. According to Professor Pizzi, the
American trial system is fundamentally "weak" in contrast to the
"strong" trial systems of the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and
to a lesser extent England (p. 4). Professor Pizzi asserts that the
dominant criterion of "strength" in a trial system is the ability of
the system to make reliable determinations about the "true"
guilt or innocence of any given defendant (pp. 69, 222-23). The
American trial system is fundamentally "weak," according to
Professor Pizzi, because it privileges fairness norms at the ex-
pense of "truth" (pp. 71-72). Professor Pizzi maintains that legal
institutions-primarily courts-are far too concerned about the
rights of suspects and defendants. He claims that the strong
emphasis on the rights of suspects and defendants and other
fairness considerations has resulted in the establishment and
elaboration of rules and procedural safeguards that function as
barriers to "truth" (pp. 71-72).
Professor Pizzi also argues that the truth crisis in the crimi-
nal process is further exacerbated by our stubborn adherence to
a hyper-adversarial model of adjudication (p. 118-31). Accord-
ing to Professor Pizzi, rules designed to promote fairness and
safeguard defendants' rights conspire with the adversarial
model of adjudication to severely undermine the truth-seeking
function of the trial process (pp. 131-33). Equally significant, in
Professor Pizzi's opinion, is the way in which such reforms have
turned the American trial system into a regime of "excess"--a
system that is zealously confrontational, overly proceduralized,
and far too concerned with "winning" and "losing" as opposed
to determining the "truth" (p. 139).
The salvation of the American trial process, according to
Professor Pizzi, lies in the placement of "truth-seeking" at the
center of the criminal process. To accomplish this, Pizzi pro-
poses the incorporation of discrete features of Western Euro-
pean inquisitorial trial processes into the American trial process.
Among other things, Pizzi advocates a bestowal of greater dis-
cretion to police officers to ensure thorough and complete in-
vestigations (pp. 67-68, 222-23), and to trial judges to develop
2000] 693
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and manage cases (p. 222). 8 Along with the aggregation of
authority within law enforcement and courts, Professor Pizzi
recommends a corresponding relaxation of rules, procedures,
and protections enjoyed by modem criminal suspects and de-
fendants, which in Professor Pizzi's opinion, have only served as
structural impediments to accurate and reliable determinations
of guilt (pp. 223-26).
Professor Pizzi has written for nearly a decade about the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the American trial process
vis-a-vis its Western European counterparts. Not surprisingly,.
Trials Without Truth borrows heavily from his earlier work.7 Yet,
in some of that earlier work, Professor Pizzi's praise for inquisi-
torial processes employed in continental legal systems was tem-
pered by reservations about the ability to seamlessly incorporate
structural elements from those regimes into the American trial
system. Moreover, Professor Pizzi has, on occasion, defended
certain aspects of the American adversarial system-prosecuto-
rial discretion and plea-bargaining, for example-as legitimate
within the American context.9 In this earlier work, Professor
Pizzi seemed to endorse comparative approaches to criminal
procedure primarily as an effective means of opening one's
6 Pizzi is not the only scholar to have. argued that the salvation of the American
criminal process lies in the emulation of European processes. See, e.g.,John H. Lang-
bein, Money Talks, Clients Walk, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 17, 1995, at 32, 32, 34 (arguing that
the American criminal justice system possesses "deep structural flaws" that unduly
compromise the trial process, as compared to the "effective, fair and trouble-free
criminaljustice systems" of Western Europe). Interestingly, Langbein offered a simi-
lar recommendation with respect to reforming American civil procedure. SeeJohn H.
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 823 (1985).
Examples of this earlier work include: William T. Pizzi, The American "Adversary
System"?, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 847 (1998); William T. Pizzi, Discovering Who We Are: An
English Perspective on the Simpson Tria 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1027 (1996); William T.
Pizzi, Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of the American CriminalJustice System, 13
CoNsr. CommENTAR 55 (1996); William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in
German Courtrooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. J. INT'L L.
37 (1996); William T. Pizzi, Soccer, Football, and Trial Systems, 1 CoLUM. J. EuR. L 369
(1995); William T. Pizzi, Understanding Prosecutorial Discretion in the United States: The
Limits of Comparative Criminal Procedure as an Instrument of Reform, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325
(1993); William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure:
The Difficulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE
J. INT'LL. 1 (1992).
'See Pizzi, UnderstandingProsecutorial Discretion, supra note 7, at 135-54, 1373.
9See id. at 1346-51, 1355-62.
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mind to reformist possibilities, yet Professor Pizzi also appeared
to understand that problems associated with practical imple-
mentation were both real and substantial. As Professor Pizzi
himself once observed:
[A] legal system is much more than a set of procedures for deter-
mining guilt and deciding on sentences. It is tied to important cultural,
historical, and political values, making it unlikely that any reform incor-
porated from a system that does not share those values will be adopted
or, even if adopted, will ever accomplish what it was intended to do.'
In Trials Without Truth, Professor Pizzi's tone is far less
measured, and far more confrontational. What prompted this
shift in position? The answer is not at all clear, but one might
suspect that the acquittal of oJ. Simpson for the murders of his
ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and Marc Goldman is at least
partly responsible. As Professor Pizzi notes in the introduction
to his book, "[t]he Simpson case stunned the system out of its
complacency.... [and] showed very little of which we could be
proud" (p. 2). Professor Pizzi too must have been stunned, for
he seems to have abandoned all his fears and reservations about
mixing elements of the American and continental trial proc-
esses. Prior to the Simpson case, the American criminal trial
process was in need of tweaking to streamline the proceedings.
Following Simpson's acquittal, America has a system of "trials
without truth" that can only be salvaged by getting rid of the
great majority of procedural and structural impediments that
hinder the discovery of "truth" by the police, judges, and jurors.
This review essay examines and critiques the descriptive and
prescriptive claims regarding the trial process advanced in Pro-
fessor Pizzi's book.
I. THREE PRELIMINARY CRITIQUES
Trials Without Truth proves to be a provocative work that ac-
cents interesting reformist possibilities within the criminal pro-
cess. Yet the book is not without flaws. What follows is a brief
discussion of three small criticisms that I believe point to larger,
more problematic features of the book. The first of these criti-
'o Id. at 1373.
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cisms relates to the type of support Professor Pizzi relies upon to
drive his arguments. That Professor Pizzi uses aberrational and
sensational cases-the Simpson case, the Louise Woodward case,
and the tragicomic episode of Colin Ferguson's self-
representation-as the basis for making broad claims about the
overall nature of the American criminal process might cause
some readers to question from the outset the sincerity of Pizzi's
critique. Indeed, in response to an earlier work in which Pizzi
employed a similar approach, Professor Ronald Allen appropri-
ately warned that "drawing lessons from the Simpson case about
the criminal justice system, or designing solutions to the prob-
lems of that case that are to be applied to the system as a whole
are dubious undertakings.""
Professor Allen made a second criticism of that earlier work
that applies with equal force here-namely, that Professor Pizzi
does not properly distinguish between criminal processes that
are "built," such as those developed in many Western European
countries following a civil code tradition, and those that are
"grown," such as the regimes in England, the United States, and
other common law countries. 2 The conceptual and practical
differences between these two legal orders are quite substantial,
and counsel us to be wary of introducing reform measures into
the American system that are borrowed without regard either to
context or to the possible consequences. As Professor Allen put
it, "Is]hooting magic bullets into spontaneous orders raises
doubts on both sides of the equations; both costs and benefits
are dramatically unpredictable."' 3
Likewise, one might take issue with Professor Pizzi's fetishi-
zation of a particular kind of truth in the trial process. Profes-
sor Pizzi seems to equate historical fact-that is, whether person
"X" committed a particular act proscribed by law-with a full-
blown guilt determination-that is, whether person "X" should
be criminally sanctioned for having committed the act in question.
Of course, the guilt determination is far more than a simple
" RonaldJ. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice Process, and Magic
Bullets, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 989, 994 (1996).
'2 I& at 994.
"3 Id. at 999-1000.
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finding of historical fact-even in an inquisitorial regime. A
guilt determination contemplates moral condemnation for the
act as well. Defenses and mitigating factors provide "moral"
facts-tidbits of information regarding the psychology, motiva-
tion, or competency of the accused-that accent the historical
facts, and inform our decision as to whether the action or event
deserves criminal sanction. The moral dimension of criminal
adjudication is most powerfully felt in the death penalty con-
text." In Spaziano v. 1/orida, 5 Justice Stevens remarked upon the
essential role of the jury in both administering and legitimizing
capital punishment. "If the State wishes to execute a citizen,"
Stevens wrote, "it must persuade ajury of his peers that death is
an appropriate punishment for his offense."'6 Here, persuasion
moves beyond the assertion of brute facts as to whether the de-
fendant committed a particular crime for which a death sen-
tence is statutorily authorized. It necessarily contemplates a
finding of moral culpability (or deservedness). For this reason,
as Justice Stevens observed, "[t]he constitutional legitimacy of
capital punishment depends upon the extent to which the pro-
cess is able to produce results which reflect the community's
moral sensibilities."
17
Professor Pizzi's privileging of historical truth also seems
oddly misdirected given that no legal system can ever determine
a defendant's guilt or innocence with absolute certainty. The
reality of criminal litigation is that evidence rarely excludes all
other possibilities. Witness testimony is necessarily limited by
the vagaries of human memory and recall. For this reason,
"truth" determinations in the criminal process contemplate far
more than mere identification of historical fact, and thus re-
'" Of course, morality arguably plays a role in criminal trials more generally. As
Judge Learned Hand stated, the institution of the jury "introduces a slack into the en-
forcement of law, tempering its rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical
conventions." United States ex re. v. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.
1942).
" 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
16 Id. at 490 (StevensJ, concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17 id.
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quire a nuanced and far less anesthetized inquiry in order to
trigger the moral condemnation of society."
Each of these criticisms point to a deeper, more fundamen-
tal problem with the book-namely, Professor Pizzi's failure to
pay close attention to certain critical features of the American
criminal process that sharply limit the usefulness of making
cross-national comparisons. More specifically, Professor Pizzi
does not take seriously the powerful ideological and cultural
underpinnings that gave rise to and continue to sustain the ex-
isting procedural regime in the face of opposition. He seems to
have forgotten or chosen to ignore a critical feature of modem
criminal procedure-that the criminal procedural revolution
was part and parcel of a much larger liberal reformist agenda
designed to counter claims of American moral and systemic il-
legitimacy. The transformation of the criminal process, like
many other aspects of the American society at that time, was
precipitated by the repeated and unapologetic exposure of
American society and legal institutions as betrayers of demo-
cratic principle. In the criminal context, it became clear that
the criminal process prior to modem reform efforts placed little
value on "truth," especially when indigent and minority suspects
and defendants were involved. Indeed, law enforcement played
a critical role in sustaining that failure of process. Equally im-
portant was the role of courts and legislatures in compromising
principle in the name of racial oppression to ensure the longev-
ity of the biased regime. The criminal process revolution, then,
was the expression of a profound desire to return truth and
democratic principle to America's legal institutions-a deliberate
(albeit limited) effort to attain moral redemption and regain in-
stitutional legitimacy.
" Indeed, we value lay participation in guilt determination precisely because we
understand this moral dimension of the trial process, and seek to have community
notions ofjustice to temper the literal application of legal norms to facts. For a dis-
cussion of the moral dimensions of jury participation in the criminal process, see
generallyJEEABAMSON, WE, T-EJURY (1994) (examining the role of the jury as
providers of "common sense" to the trial system) and Steven L Friedland, The Compe-
tenu" and Responsibility ofJurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 190, 192 (1990)
(conceptualizing the jury inter alia as a representative body that should "convey the
moral condemnation of the community in a criminal case").
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The crisis of institutional legitimacy and quest for moral re-
demption are powerfully relevant to Professor Pizzi's concerns
about "truth" in the criminal trial process. As an initial matter,
Professor Pizzi's lack of adequate attention to context exposes
critical failings in his descriptive account of the American trial
process. In particular, by failing to consider the peculiar con-
text that gave rise to modern reform of the American criminal
process, Professor Pizzi overestimates the truthfulness of the trial
process prior to the establishment of procedural rules and safe-
guards that he criticizes. At the same time, Professor Pizzi radi-
cally underestimates the extent to which Warren era reform
enhanced the accuracy and reliability of guilt determinations.
Additionally, when placed against the backdrop of this uniquely
American context, Professor Pizzi's descriptive claims regarding
procedural constraints on police investigations appear some-
what exaggerated.
Professor Pizzi's inattention to the historical and arguably
ongoing crisis of legitimacy in the American criminal process
also exposes critical defects in his reform proposal. The fun-
damental problem is that each of Professor Pizzi's recommenda-
tions presupposes a level of legitimacy currently not enjoyed by
the system. A number of recent, high-profile incidents involv-
ing abuses of police and prosecutorial authority, along with lin-
gering concerns about current law enforcement and sentencing
policy, suggest that we should, at a minimum, entertain serious
questions regarding the legitimacy of the criminal process.
From the perspective of those who continue to question the le-
gitimacy of the criminal process, Professor Pizzi's proposal runs
the serious risk of undermining "truth" insofar as he seeks to
aggregate power in the hands of legal actors and institutions
that, in many ways, still lack integrity in the eyes of the public.
Because Pizzi does not address these indicia of the ongoing cri-
sis of legitimacy, his recommendation to abandon a great deal
of procedural protections and safeguards that provided limited
protection against such transgressions raises more questions
than it answers.
The remainder of this essay develops these arguments. Part
II describes the early- to mid-twentieth century collapse of moral
20001 699
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legitimacy of American legal institutions, and the efforts under-
taken by legal actors and institutions to seek moral redemption
and re-establish institutional legitimacy through liberal legal re-
form. In Part III, I shall situate and critique Professor Pizzi's de-
scriptive and prescriptive claims regarding the American
criminal process within this expanded context. Part IV con-
cludes.
II. THE COLLAPSE OF INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMmACYAND THE RISE OF
PROCEDURAL REFORM
The prevailing moral crisis of twentieth century American
society has been the ongoing struggle to reconcile fundamental
democratic and egalitarian precepts with the harshly undemo-
cratic and inegalitarian practices carried out under the banner
of those principles. This crisis constitutes a crucial dimension
of any serious inquiry into the pitfalls and possibilities of mid- to
late-twentieth century liberal reform of the criminal process.
Indeed, the modem American criminal process and its norma-
tive underpinnings are best understood when one takes seri-
ously the manner in which this crisis pre-figured liberal
institutional reform.
A. THE FAILURE OF PROCESS-MOORE V. DEMPSEYAND THE
SCOTTSBORO CASES
The precepts of American democracy-freedom and equal-
ity of individuals-as an historical matter have had catastrophic
meaning in the daily lives of many Americans. Idealized notions
of freedom and equality lie at the core of American national
identity, and provide the centripetal force necessary to generate
coherence in such a profoundly pluralistic society. Yet beneath
the heavy gloss of this idealized America lies a far more perni-
cious and vulgar reality. The mid-twentieth century exposure of
American society as a "disparate" democracy-as betrayer of its
best principles-would present a serious challenge to the le-
gitimacy of many American institutions, and would provide a




Modem efforts to expose the moral illegitimacy of Ameri-
can legal institutions began in earnest at the dawn of the twenti-
eth century when liberal advocates sought to highlight the
betrayal of democratic principle in the name of racial subjuga-
tion. Challenges to racially restrictive covenants,' 9 racially exclu-
sive primary elections,20 and segregated educational facilities2
brought to light the extent of civil and social disempowerment
visited upon African-Americans as marginalized citizens in a
purportedly free society. This sustained effort eventually re-
sulted in a series of landmark decisions that transformed a great
deal of the racial legal order.2
The seeds for reform of the criminal process were likewise
sown during this historic moment. A series of important crimi-
nal cases highlighted the dramatic failure of process that rou-
tinely occurred when African-American defendants were
involved, but more importantly, exposed the manner in which
racist politics had undermined the truth-seeking function of the
trial process. In Moore v. Dempsey, the Court reviewed the con-
viction of a group of African-American men, each of whom had
been sentenced to death.2 The men were thought to have been
"ringleaders" in the Arkansas race riot of 1919, in which a white
deputy sheriff was killed and another white person wounded.24
Although African-Americans in Phillips County, Arkansas out-
numbered white Americans three to one, the men were never-
theless indicted by an all-white grand jury, and tried before all
'9 Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917).
"0 See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 46 (1935); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73,
82 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
,Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
"The most notable of these decisions were: Smith v. Allwrigh. 321 U.S. 649, 663-64
(1944), which declared an all-white Democratic primary in Texas unconstitutional;
Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 386 (1946), which declared state-compelled segrega-
tion in interstate public transportation unconstitutional; ShedL/e v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
20 (1948), which declared court enforcement of racially restrictive covenants uncon-
stitutional; and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), which declared seg-
regation in public schools unconstitutional.
23 See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87 (1923).
' See id. at 87-89.
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white juries.' The first trial lasted forty-five minutes.26 The jury
deliberated for five minutes, and returned with a verdict of
guilty of murder in the first degree, which carried with it a
mandatory death sentence.2 The remaining defendants re-
ceived similar treatment, each ultimately sentenced to death.
The defendants subsequently filed writs of habeas corpus, in
which they claimed that they had been deprived of due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment.2
In a 7-2 decision, the Court overruled the lower court's dis-
missal of the writs of habeas corpus, finding that mob domina-
tion of the trial proceedings constituted reversible error.0 The
Court held that the petitioners' allegations sufficiently demon-
strated that they had been deprived of their lives without due
process of law." Two years later, these men-along with sixty-
seven other African-Americans who had been coerced into
pleading guilty and had received life sentences-were set free
by the state of Arkansas.3
2
In Powell v. Alabama,-" also known as the Scottsboro Boys Case,
the Supreme Court considered the conviction and capital sen-
tence of nine black teenagers for the alleged rape of two white
girls. Justice Sutherland describes the manner in which they
were brought to trial:
Both girls and the negroes then were taken to Scottsboro, the
county seat. Word of their coming and of the alleged assault had pre-
ceded them, and they were met at Scottsboro by a large crowd. It does
not sufficiently appear that the defendants were seriously threatened
with, or that they were actually in danger of, mob violence; but it does
appear that the attitude of the community was one of great hostility.
The sheriff thought it necessary to call for the militia to assist in safe-
2 See RICHARD KLUGFR, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCA-




See id. at 114.
" Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86,91-92 (1923).
1 "Id.
"See KLUGER, SIMLEJusucE, supra note 25, at 114.
"Powell v. Alabama (Scottsboro I), 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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guarding the prisoners. ChiefJustice Anderson pointed out in his opin-
ion that every step taken from the arrest and arraignment to the sen-
tence was accompanied by the military. Soldiers took the defendants to
Gadsden for safe-keeping, brought them back to Scottsboro for ar-
raignment, returned them to Gadsden for safe-keeping while awaiting
trial, escorted them to Scottsboro for trial a few days later, and guarded
the court house and grounds at every stage of the proceedings. It is per-
fectly apparent that the proceedings, from beginning to end, took place
in an atmosphere of tense, hostile, and excited public sentiment. Dur-
ing the entire time, the defendants were closely confined or were under
military guard. The record does not disclose their ages, except that one
of them was nineteen; but the record clearly indicates that most, if not
all, of them were youthful, and they are constantly referred to as "the
boys." They were ignorant and illiterate. All of them were residents of
other states, where alone members of their families or friends 
resided.3 4
The Court declared that in cases involving circumstances as
egregious as those present in Scottsboro, an indigent accused of
a capital crime has the right to a state-provided attorney.35
However, as the Court observed, defendants were not given a
reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel.3 The Court thus
concluded that the trial court's failure to make an effective ap-
pointment of counsel to aid the defendants in preparing and
presenting their defense constituted a denial of defendants'
right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment,
and remanded the case back to the trial court. The defen
dants were subsequently retried and convicted, and three years
later, the Court reversed the second conviction.m In a unani-
mous decision, the Court reversed the conviction on the ground
that the State of Alabama had denied defendants due process of
law on account of their race. 9
Id. at 51-52.
Id. at 59-60, 73.
6Id. at 71.
" le at 71, 73.
Norris v. Alabama (Scottsboro II), 294 U.S. 587 (1935).
See id. at 599. An Alabama statute at the time was being interpreted by state au-
thorities to exclude African-Americans consistently from participating as grand or
petit jurors in the criminal trials of other African-Americans. See id. at 590-91. The
Court held that this practice violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and denied defendants a fair trial. Id at 596. The Court reaffirmed this
holding three years later in Hale v. Kentucdy, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938) (per curiam).
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Dempsey and Scottboro are compelling cases not only because
they highlight obvious failures of process commonly endured by
early twentieth century African-Americans, but because they
remind us that things might have been a great deal worse. In
both cases, the defendants faced a very real possibility of death
at the hand of an angry, white lynch mob. In the early part of
the twentieth century, the practice of lynching was the power
offstage that subverted a great deal of civil and criminal justice.0
In Dempsey and the Scottsboro cases, law enforcement officials and
lower courts were directly involved in the subjugation of the
complaining litigants. Of course, it was not uncommon for lo-
cal enforcement officials to conspire with unruly whites to facili-
tate the execution of lynch mob justice.4' When one situates
Demsey and the Scottsboro cases against the backdrop of prevailing
norms of justice, the image is not simply of a trial-process ren-
dered unfair, but that of a legacy of racial subjugation absurdly
carried out on behalf of a democratic state made singular based
upon its purported commitment to equality and the rights of
individuals.42
In addition to providing a window into the nature of crimi-
nal process for minority and indigent defendants, as it existed
prior to reform, Dempsey and the Scottsboro cases point to the
'0 The power of lynching lies in the sheer absurdity of violence carried out against
its victims. See, e.g., WALTERT. HOWARD, LYNCHINGS: EXTRALEGAL VIOLENcE IN FLORIDA
DURING THE 1930s at 60-61 (1995) (describing a lynching preceded by "a carnival of
sadism" that included amputation of victim's fingers and toes, burning of the victim's
torso with "[red hot irons," and cutting off the victim's genitals); NAACP, The Stoiy of
100 Lynchings, in TwmIYYEARs OF LYNCHING IN THE UNITED STATES, 1889-1918 at 26
(1919) (describing in graphic detail the lynching of Georgia woman: "Mary Turner
was pregnant and was hung by her feet. Gasoline was thrown on her clothing and it
was set on fire. Her body was cut open and her infant fell onto the ground with a lit-
tie cry, to be crushed to death by the heel of one of the white men present. The
mother's body was then riddled with bullets.").
41 See ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, TIE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950
at 8 (1980) (remarking that "public officials... either cooperated with the mob or
sought refuge in silence and inaction").
42 See DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN Sourn 115 (rev.
ed. 1992) (noting that "lynchings were increasingly replaced by situations in which
the Southern legal system prostituted itself to the mob's demand"). According to his-
torian Arthur F. Raper, such sham proceedings "retained the essence of mob murder,
shedding only its outward forms." Id. (quoting Arthur F. Raper, Race and Class Pres-
sures 277-78 (1940) (unpublished manuscript)).
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primary means through which the system sought to redeem it-
self. In both cases, appellate courts were made available to the
litigants to contest the legitimacy of the lower court's ruling."
With each succeeding challenge-and the corresponding expo-
sure of the failure of process:--the legitimacy of American in-
stitutions and the integrity of institutional actors were
increasingly called into question.4 Modem reform of the
criminal process, like most liberal reform that occurred during
this period, came about in response to sustained efforts to high-
light the prevailing social crisis of moral legitimacy in American
society and legal institutions. In short, the task was to brand
American legal institutions as betrayers of principle in order to
trigger a sympathetic institutional response that would signal a
return to legitimacy.
B. MORAL REDEMPTION AND THE RECLAMATION OF
INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY
The touchstone of any democratic legal order is legiti-
46macy. A legal regime must be perceived as legitimate by mem-
bers of the regulated body if it is to retain any authority over
that body. Accordingly, perhaps the single greatest challenge
4For a more comprehensive discussion of Dempsey, see RiCHARD C. CORTNER, A
MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988). For a de-
tailed account of the events surrounding the Scottsboro cases, see JAMES GOODMAN,
STORIES OF SCOrrSBORO (1994), and DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE
AMERICAN SOuTH (1969).
" The trial and acquittal of two whites charged with the lynching of Emmitt Till in
1955 presents a compelling example in this regard. For a brief but compelling dis-
cussion of this case, see RANDALF .ENNEDY, RACE, CgRIM, AND THE LAW 59-63 (1998).
Notably, in both Dempsey and the Scottsboro Cases, it was the Supreme Court that
prevented the execution of the defendants through the articulation of rules designed
to reclaim legitimacy for the criminal process.
* The legitimacy of any legal order must rest on law's claim to emerge from a
democratically reasoned and "reason-giving" process. SeeJURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACrS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEmOCRACY
409 (1996) ("A legal order is legitimate to the extent that it equally secures the co-
original private and political autonomy of its citizens; at the same time, however, it
owes its legitimacy to the forms of communication in which alone this autonomy can
express and prove itself.").
17 This is especially true in the criminal context, where the use of force is at its
height. "Constitutional, democratic, humane legal orders are distinguishable from
their lawless, authoritarian, and barbaric counterparts by the ways they authorize and
use the coercive force at their disposal.... Yet constitutional violence is violence
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presented by the mid-century push for liberal reform was the
structuring of a legitimizing institutional response that would re-
turn the privileged moral and political status that American in-
stitutions were thought to have previously enjoyed. The loss of
moral authority for American institutions-especially American
legal institutions-created a social crisis of epic proportions that
American institutions had no legitimate power to correct in the
name of principle. Indeed, one might have argued at the time
that the extended legacy of betrayal in the name of such princi-
ples rendered the principles themselves inherently suspect. In
the absence of a legitimate moral authority to speak self-
consciously about a commitment to racial equality, in the vac-
uum of trust generated by exposure of the lie of American de-
mocracy, American institutions sought moral redemption
through structural changes that would place strong limits on the
ability of majoritarian society to abuse authority and further
compromise an already morally suspect regime.
Criminal procedural reform therefore was part and parcel
of these structural reforms tailored to attain moral redemption
and re-establish institutional legitimacy. The most prominent
features of the structural reforms of the criminal process were
the various rules and procedural "safeguards" established by the
Warren Court. The institutional response to claims that police
officers routinely trampled on the rights of suspects in order to
facilitate harassment, seize evidence, or extract confessions was
the establishment of a regime of rules to guide police investiga-
tions. In order to place some limits on the unprovoked harass-
ment of criminal suspects, the Court, in Terry v. Ohio48 created a
two-tiered approach to classify police conduct in order to bring
these "low-level" detentions within the ambit of the Fourth
Amendment by requiring police to show a reasonable suspicion
in order to justify such investigatory stops.' To place limits on
the intrusiveness of police searches for evidence, the Court in
Mapp v. Ohio held that the Fourth Amendment not only
nonetheless; it crushes and kills with a steadfastness equal to a violence undisciplined
by legitimacy." AUSTIN SARAT & THOMAS R. KEARNS, Introduction to LAW's VIOLENCE 5
(Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992).




guarded against unreasonable searches and seizures, but also
justified the exclusion of any illegally seized evidence from
criminal trials.50 With respect to the claim of coerced confes-
sions, the Court in Miranda v. Arizona placed clear limits on the
manner in which suspects could be questioned at the police sta-
tion.5 ' Additional safeguards were put in place to protect a sus-
pect's rights at line-ups, 2 trial5 3 and on appeal.!
The Warren era reforms of the criminal process are best
understood as part of the overall struggle to regain institutional
legitimacy-to gain moral redemption in the wake of racial
shame. As one commentator wrote in 1968:
The Court's concern with criminal procedure can be understood
only in the context of the struggle for civil rights.... It is hard to con-
ceive of a Court that would accept the challenge of guaranteeing the
rights of Negroes and other disadvantaged groups to equality before the
law and at the same time do nothing to ameliorate the invidious dis-
crimination between rich and poor which existed in the criminal proc-
ess. It would have been equally anomalous for such a Court to ignore
the clear evidence that members of disadvantaged groups generally bore
the brunt of most unlawful police activity.0
This reformist disposition would inform subsequent at-
tempts to regulate grand and petit jury selection. For instance,
modem criminal procedure now regulates grand jury selection
in three distinct ways. First, the Equal Protection Clause forbids
discriminatory selection practices. 6 The complaining party
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
,SeeMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486,479 (1966).
52 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (defendant has right to
counsel at post-indictment line-ups).
5S See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (Fifth Amendment forbids
both comment by prosecution on defendant's refusal to testify and instructions to
jury that defendant's trial silence is evidence of guilt); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
35, 345 (1963) (providing right to counsel for indigent defendants in felony cases).
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (indigent entitled to ap-
pointed counsel at state mandatory appeal stage); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19
(1956) (indigent defendant has right to obtain free trial transcripts in order to en-
sure adequate appellate review).
" A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Cout and Criminal Procedure, 67 MlcH. L. REv. 249,
256 (1968).
"See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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must show that the discrimination was intentional, of course,
but intent is somewhat less difficult to prove in grand jury cases
than in other kinds of equal protection cases. Second, the
Equal Protection Clause forbids intentional discrimination in
the selection of the grand jury foreman.58 Third, the Fifth
Amendment requires that grand juries be selected from a fair
cross-section of the community.5 9 Petit jury selection is likewise
governed by both the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section re-
quiremente and the Equal Protection Clause. Selection
related violations in both the grand and petit jury context man-
date automatic reversal.6 2 An important feature of these reforms
is that they have the dual-effect of ensuring fairness while simul-
taneously improving accuracy and reliability ofjury verdicts.
When one situates the reform of the criminal process within
the larger context of Warren Court era liberal reform-which
included not only racial reform of public educationo and social
interaction,6 but also the elaboration of protections afforded to
religious minorities,65 free speech advocates,6 and the indi-
-7 See Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1105,
1119-26 (1989).
See WAVNN P. LAFAVE &JERoLD H. IsRAEL, C IwPaocmuRE § 15.4(c), at 699-
702 (1992).
59 See id. § 15.4(d), at 702-03.
6See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). Fair cross-section violations, how-
ever, apply only to the pool from which the jury is drawn, not to the jury itself. See
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173-74 (1986).
6' See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
62 SeeVasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260-64 (1986) (grandjury); Batson, 476 U.S
at 100 (petitjury, equal protection challenge); Duren, 439 U.S. at 370 (petit jury, fair
cross-section).
Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294 (1955); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (Virginia statute prohibiting interracial
marriages violates "the central meaning" of the Equal Protection Clause).
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (requiring government to prove
compelling interest in applying purportedly neutral government policy that com-
promises minority religious beliefs); School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963) (declaring unconstitutional a state law requiring ten verses from
the Bible to be read aloud at the opening of each public school day); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421 (1962) (finding school prayer unconstitutional).
"See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that First Amend-
ment shielded newspaper from a libel suit for printing falsehoods about a public offi-
cial). Like many cases during the Warren years, there was a racial subtext to the
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gent-as well as congressional racial reform,6 one gains a
fuller appreciation of the extent to which the Court sought
moral redemption and institutional legitimacy as a means to
dispel America's profound sense of shame.6
This, of course, is not to suggest that modem criminal pro-
cedure is either unproblematic or enjoys the highly coveted
status of near-universal acceptance. One can point to a number
of issues-incidents of police brutality, alleged abuses of prose-
cutorial authority, and curious sentencing disparities, for exam-
ple----that cause many observers of the criminal process to
question the integrity of both the system and its administrators.
Indeed, the persistence of these kinds of incidents suggests
quite strongly that the criminal process continues to suffer from
a legitimacy crisis. Warren era reform of the criminal process,
then, proves disappointingly incomplete. Nevertheless, this pe-
riod of reform is an important historic moment insofar as it tells
us a great deal about the nature of the crisis of criminal proce-
dure in American society, and focuses our attention on the un-
derlying principles that should discipline our impulse for
systemic reform.
Sullivan case, it involved an attempt by the State of Alabama to force a newspaper that
had published pro-desegregation advertisements out of business. Thus, as Professor
Horwitz remarked, "Even those Warren Court cases that are doctrinally not about
race are almost always, in one way or another, ultimately about the agony of race rela-
tions in America." Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit ofJustice, 50
WASH. &LEEL. REv. 5, 8 (1993).
67 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966) (striking
down a poll tax of $1.50 on all Virginia residents over twenty-one as discriminating
against the indigent's right to vote); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (pro-
viding a right to counsel for the indigent at all felony trials); Douglas v. California,
372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963) (granting the right to counsel because of the equality de-
manded by the Fourteenth Amendment); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956)
(holding that an indigent criminal defendant's direct appeal cannot be denied be-
cause of an inability to afford a transcript).
" The legislative bestowal of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights
Act can likewise be interpreted as an effort at moral redemption-an admission by
larger society that the fruits of American freedom and democracy had been deliber-
ately and unjustifiably restricted to white Americans.
Not surprisingly, commentators increasingly suggest that the Warren Court's re-
form of the criminal process ought to be treated as a branch of race relations law. See
WilliamJ. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 & n.4 (1997).
70 These and related items are discussed infra Part IlI.B.
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III. REDEMPTION, SYSTEMIC LEGITIMACY, AND THE PURsUrr OF
TRUTH IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
The crisis of institutional legitimacy and quest for moral re-
demption are powerfully relevant to Professor Pizzi's concerns
about "truth" in the criminal trial process. Professor Pizzi
points to the Simpson case and others as examples of trials char-
acterized by the subversion of truth. But if there is one lesson to
be taken from the Simpson case, it is that "truth" in the Ameri-
can trial system (or any democratic legal order for that matter)
depends upon the perceived legitimacy of the finder of that
"truth," the means by which "truth" is discovered, and the man-
ner in which the system acts upon that "truth." In this sense,
questions of institutional legitimacy are inseparable from con-
cerns about truth in the trial process. As discussed below, Pro-
fessor Pizzi's failure to give adequate attention to these
legitimacy concerns exposes critical failings in both his descrip-
tive account of the American trial process, and in his prescrip-
tion for reform.
A. A CRITIQUE OF PIZZI'S DESCRIPTIVE CLAIMS
Professor Pizzi.'s failure to appreciate the extent to which
the American criminal process has suffered the taint of illegiti-
macy weakens his descriptive account of the trial process. As an
initial matter, Professor Pizzi's failure to consider the context
causes him to overestimate the truthfulness of the trial process
prior to the establishment of procedural rules and safeguards
that he criticizes. According to Professor Pizzi, Warren era re-
form measures have resulted in the erosion of truth in the
criminal process. In advocating the removal of these reform
measures, our process will become appropriately refocused and
truth will be magically restored to the trial process. Yet as
Dempsey, Scottsboro, and many other cases suggest, truth was not
always at the center of the trial process.
Consider Professor Pizzi's discussion of police investiga-
tions. For Professor Pizzi, truth is first sacrificed during the in-
vestigatory stage, where police are subject to various constraints
on their ability to search and question suspects. He argues that
the exclusionary rule, which suppresses reliable evidence un-
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constitutionally seized by police officers, sacrifices too much
"truth" while at the same time does a poor job of deterring po-
lice misconduct (p. 37). Professor Pizzi also questions the wis-
dom of the Miranda ruling, which places constraints on the
ability of police officers to question suspects, and suppresses in-
criminating statements obtained during the course of improper
questioning (pp. 62-68). He suggests that criminal defendants
should be given less protection so as to enable the police to
conduct a more "complete" investigation because a "complete"
investigation is likely to yield a more accurate and reliable out-
come (pp. 67-68).
In making this recommendation, however, Professor Pizzi
fails to address the fact that the moral crisis of the criminal pro-
cess resulted, in part, from the key role played by law enforce-
ment in undermining the integrity of the criminal process.
Consider, for example, the case of Screws v. United States,7 1 as de-
scribed by Justice William 0. Douglas:
This case involves a shocking and revolting episode in law enforce-
ment. Petitioner Screws was sheriff of Baker County, Georgia. He en-
listed the assistance of petitioner Jones, a policeman, and petitioner
Kelley, a special deputy, in arresting Robert Hall, a citizen of the United
States and of Georgia. The arrest was made late at night at Hall's home
on a warrant charging Hall with theft of a tire. Hall, a young negro
about thirty years of age, was handcuffed and taken by car to the court
house. As Hall alighted from the car at the court-house square, the
three petitioners began beating him with their fists and with a solid-bar
blackjack about eight inches long and weighing two pounds. They
claimed Hall had reached for a gun and had used insulting language as
he alighted from the car. But after Hall, still handcuffed, had been
knocked to the ground they continued to beat him from fifteen to thirty
minutes until he was unconscious. Hall was then dragged feet first
through the court-house yard into the jail and thrown upon the floor dy-
ing. An ambulance was called and Hall was removed to a hospital where
he died within the hour and without regaining consciousness. There
was evidence that Screws held a grudge against Hall and had threatened
to "get" him.72
7'325 U.S. 91 (1945).
7 Id. at 92-93.
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The record makes clear that pursuit of the "truth" played little
part in this "investigation."
Professor Pizzi suggests that alleviating existing constraints
on the ability of police to investigate as they please will move us
closer to "truth." What he fails to acknowledge is that it was the
abuse of authority and absence of integrity in the investigatory
process that led to the imposition of procedural constraints in
thefirst instance. In this sense, Professor Pizzi's account reflects a
false nostalgia for a truth-centered regime that never existed.
In addition to overestimating the truthfulness of trial process
prior to modem reform, Professor Pizzi radically underestimates
the extent to which Warren era reform enhanced the accuracy
and reliability of guilt determinations. A great deal of the mod-
em criminal procedural regime that Professor Pizzi claims un-
dermines truth actually enhances the truth-seeking function of
trials while simultaneously accenting the fairness of the criminal
process. Indeed, one might argue that much of modem consti-
tutional criminal procedure promotes accuracy and reliability-
at least to the extent that it encourages police, courts, and law-
yers to conduct themselves in a responsible way. However, cer-
tain bodies of law goveming the use of suspect line-ups,7
discovery process,74 grand jury selection, 75 and petit jury selec-
tion 76 are accuracy-enhancing in the specific sense of producing
a more reliable outcome in a particular case. Yet even in the
two main aspects of the criminal process that Professor Pizzi
claims serve as powerful obstacles to truth-the procedural con-
straints on police investigations, and the right to and role of
counsel in the trial process-it is not entirely clear that truth has
been sacrificed to the extent he suggests. In this sense, Profes-
sor Pizzi's one-dimensional analysis--one dimensional in the
See, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969) (holding that due process
mandates exclusion of out-of-court identification based on unnecessarily suggestive
identification procedure).
' See; e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that prosecutor has duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence to defendant at trial). Two subsequent cases-United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S 97 (1976) and United States v. Bagtey, 473 U.S 667 (1985)-have
helped to clarify the scope and contour of the prosecutor's duty.
7' See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
76 See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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sense that any given aspect of the regime either promotes truth,
or promotes fairness, but never both at the same time-proves
descriptively false.
For instance, Professor Pizzi tends to exaggerate the extent
to which modem criminal procedure restricts police investiga-
tions. As professor David Cole has pointed out, "since the short-
lived Warren Court era the Supreme Court has consistently wa-
tered down constitutional restrictions on police activity, leaving
wide areas of police conduct virtually unregulated."7 Most no-
tably, in United States v. Whren,7 the Supreme Court held that
police may rely upon a traffic code violation as a pretext to stop
and detain a suspect for other reasons.7 As the Court noted, "a
traffic-violation arrest (of the sort here) would not be rendered
invalid by the fact that it was 'a mere pretext for a narcotics
search."'" The Court further held that, in the course of this
stop, a police officer may choose to search the vehicle without
first informing the detainee of their right to leave."' This ruling
is consistent with the Court's ruling in Ohio v. Robinette, in which
the Court remarked that "so too would it be unrealistic to re-
quire police officers to always inform detainees that they are
free to go before a consent to search may be deemed volun-
tary.9,82 In the "stop and frisk" context, the police officers' dis-
cretion is regulated in the mildest sense-police officers need
only find "reasonable suspicion" in order to detain an individ-
ual.8 ' And, of course, there still remain areas in which police in-
vestigations are completely unregulated because the Court has
declined to find a reasonable expectation of privacy protected
by the Fourth Amendment. For example, in California v.
Greenwood, the Court held that police officers could freely
77 David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Crimi-
nal justice Scholarship, 87 GEo. LJ. 1059, 1071 & n.70 (1999).
7" 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
7Id at 811, 829.
oId. at 812-13 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973)).
std
2 Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1996); Cf Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429
(1991) (finding that suspect consented to search where officers stood over passenger,
brandishing firearms, and requested permission to search passenger's luggage).
"SeeTerry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
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search through suspected drug defendant's garbage bags be-
cause the suspects did not have a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy under the Fourth Amendment in garbage bags placed
outside their home.84 Police officers have exercised and con-
tinue to exercise a great deal of latitude in performing their in-
vestigatory functions-evidenced most recently in the Supreme
Court's decision in Illinois v. Wardlow--and as David Cole
points out, "the Court has consistently acknowledged the need
to defer to police officer's experience and to ensure that they
have the flexibility to react effectively to fluid situations."8
Similarly, Professor Pizzi tends to exaggerate the extent to
which the exclusionary rule undermines truth-seeking in the
trial process. A point that seems lost on Pizzi is that the exclu-
sion of evidence that points toward a suspect's guilt is not neces-
sarily sacrificial of truth. For example, in Stovall v. Denno, the
Supreme Court stated in dicta that due process mandates exclu-
sion of out-of-court identification based on unnecessarily sug-
gestive identification procedures.87  Although the court
acknowledged that such a rule seeks to prevent unfairness-that
"[a] conviction which rests on a mistaken identification is a
gross miscarriage ofjustice"e--it is obvious that this notion also
furthers the truth-seeking function of the criminal process.
Suggestive identification procedures raise questions about the
accuracy and reliability of the identification testimony, and may
not be counted upon to support an accurate assessment of guilt.
A similar rationale provides the normative basis of the exclu-
sionary rule-that the failure of police officers to abide by a par-
ticular set of procedures renders that evidence or confession
fundamentally unreliable.
Although it is true that procedural constraints on the ability
of police officers to investigate and extract confessions enhance
the overall accuracy and reliability in the criminal process, Pro-
"See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988).
120 S. Ct. 673 (2000). In Wardlow, the Supreme Court upheld the stop and frisk
of a person where the only cause for suspicion was the person's "headlong flight"
from police officers in an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking. Id. at 676.
Cole, supra note 1, at 1072 & n.78.




fessor Pizzi correctly observes that such constraints may pose a
barrier to truth in certain, individual cases (p. 67). But one
might interpret these as transaction costs incurred to obtain
moral legitimacy-the "price of the ticket," so to speak, for
bringing the regime in line with the best of American demo-
cratic principles. Professor Pizzi's position undoubtedly would
be that this "price" is simply too great to bear. But he cannot
make this claim in good faith aconteitually. He must speak to
the legitimacy concerns to which the regime responded. He
must argue either that the goals that procedural reform were in-
tended to meet-the moral redemption of the criminal process
and demonstration of fidelity to the best of America's demo-
cratic principles-are no longer relevant, or that the reform
measures, in today's context, no longer serve those goals. Pro-
fessor Pizzi does neither.
Rather, Professor Pizzi simply asserts that such exclusions
are bad per se, at least to the extent that they subvert the discov-
ery of "truth." In addition, he points to the practice of "testily-
ing"-where officers choose to lie under oath regarding
purported compliance with rules and procedural safeguards in
lieu of actually abiding by such procedures-as a practice that
not only undermines truth, but one that is a natural byproduct
of a regime that places too much emphasis on procedural rules
(pp. 66-67). Again, Professor Pizzi's acontextual approach pro-
hibits him from seeing the obvious-that testilying is simply a
modem iteration of the crisis of legitimacy that gave rise to pro-
cedural reform in the first place. If existing constraints are in-
sufficient to preserve the integrity of police investigations, it
cannot be, as Pizzi argues, that removal of all such safeguards
will render the investigations more reliable and accurate. If the
moral crisis is so ingrained that the officers choose to compro-
mise their personal and official integrity when questioned about
the validity of any given investigation, we should draw little com-
fort from a proposal that permits such investigations to go un-
questioned.
39 For interesting discussions of this practice, see Morgan CloudJudges, "Testilying,
and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL L. REv. 1341 (1996) and Christopher Slobogin, Testily-
ing: Police Petury and What to Do About I 67 U CoLO. L REV. 1037 (1996).
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Professor Pizzi also contends that the expanded role of de-
fense counsel has further compromised the truth-seeking func-
tion of the trial process. For example, Professor Pizzi argues
that structural changes have interposed counsel during the in-
vestigatory phase, and thereby created an additional barrier to
the "truth" (pp. 52, 124-36). What Professor Pizzi fails to recog-
nize is that Miranda represents a systemic acknowledgement that
police station confessions were presumptively illegitimate-that
the legacy of coerced and falsified confessions relied upon in
the administration of criminal justice rendered existing police
practices suspect. Absent some procedural safeguard, then,
there was no reason to believe that such statements were truth-
ful and accurate.
Interestingly, Professor Pizzi does not claim that presence of
counsel at other phases of the criminal process functions as a
barrier to truth, though this is certainly one obvious implication
of his argument. As cases from Scottsboro to Gideon v. Wainrigh
to Coleman v. Alabamad make plain, the presence of defense
counsel is indispensable to the accurate and reliable determina-
tions of guilt. Rather, Professor Pizzi argues that the modem
emphasis on procedural rather than substantive errors has ren-
dered the trial process far too adversarial. Counsel become fix-
ated on winning and losing, which leads to overzealous
litigation of collateral matters at the expense of accurate and re-
liable outcomes.
Here, Professor Pizzi has it absolutely correct. Relying on
William Stuntz's observation that more procedure "encourages
defense lawyers and courts to shift energy and attention away
from the merits and toward procedure,"92 Professor Pizzi high-
lights.the risks that excessive procedure poses to accurate and
reliable determinations (p. 193). But as Stuntz notes, the
tradeoff of merits-based claims in favor of procedural ones is
caused mainly by the lack of resources allocated toward criminal
® 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing right to counsel for indigent defendants in fel-
ony cases).
9' 399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970) (holding that the preliminary hearing constitutes a "crit-
ical stage" to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches).
9Stuntz, supra note 69, at 44.
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defense. The regulatory regime is "incomplete" because it pro-
vides lawyers with claims and arguments that would not other-
wise exist, but fails to provide appointed counsel with adequate
resources to pursue all relevant claims. The implication of
Stuntz's observation is that the acquisition of additional funding
from the legislature would go a long way to eliminating the trad-
ing off of such claims, and thereby enable zealous advocacy that
does not sacrifice truth-a point Professor Pizzi reluctantly con-
cedes (p. 194).
Finally, Professor Pizzi's failure to consider context causes
him to ignore the critical role of human agency in the admini-
stration of criminal justice. He tends to blame "the system" for
the erosion of truth when the better target might be the legal
actors within the regime. Professor Pizzi seems to have forgot-
ten that the day-to-day impact of Warren Court era criminal re-
form is heavily dependent on lower court interpretation and
application of the various rules, safeguards, and doctrines. The
Court plainly did not possess the capacity to allocate resources,
nor could it make all the structural changes needed to provide
for fair and reliable guilt determinations in all cases.93  Ulti-
mately, the Court was dependent on the states' willingness to fi-
nance, fashion, and administer significant structural reform of
the trial system. Lower courts quickly became primary judicial
regulators of police conduct and, as such, could either dilute or
expand the procedural safeguards. Thus, as Professor Peter
9' In at least two of its landmark opinions-Mirand4, and United States v. Wade-the
Warren Court explicitly sought legislative assistance in regulating police. "In Miranda,
for example, the Court stated that the specified procedures would be required 'unless
other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of si-
lence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it.'" Welsh S. White, Improv-
ing Constitutional Ciminal Procedure, 93 MicH. L. REv. 1667, 1683-84 (1995) (quoting
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966)).
Similarly, in United States v. Wad4 the Court emphasized that "[l]egislative or other
regulations ... eiminat[ing] the risks of abuse and unintentional suggestion at lineup
proceedings and the impediments to meaningful confrontation at trial" could displace the
constitutional requirement imposed by the Court. ... In both cases, Congress failed to
provide a meaningful response.
Id. (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967)).
As Professor Amsterdam observed, a Fourth Amendment ruling by the Supreme
Court "filters down to the level of flesh and blood suspects only through the refract-
ing layers of lower courts, trial judges, magistrates and police officials" and "in few
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Arenella observed, to a large extent, "judicial implementation of
the Warren Court's due process norms rested on the lower
courts' sympathy or hostility to the values served by the Court's
doctrine."9
That the efficacy of Warren Court era procedural reform
was dependent upon voluntary compliance should not be over-
looked. Professor Pizzi asserts that there is a dramatic failure of
process in the American trial system, and places that blame
squarely on the procedural mechanisms that he claims serves as
barriers to truth. But it is not entirely clear whether the root
cause of the failure is due to actors within the regime, or the
structure of the regime itself. One might justifiably criticize the
regime as poorly thought out or incomplete in terms of its
ability to adequately regulate conduct by legal actors. But to
simply assert a failure of process, without making an effort to
identify its root causes, ultimately fails to persuade.
other areas of law are the filters as opaque as in the area of suspects' rights." Anthony
G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U.
L. Rxv. 785, 792 (1970).
9- Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Bur-
ger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L. J. 185, 191 (1983). More often than not,
hostility towards suspects and defendants reigned supreme:
To a mind-staggering extent ... the entire system of criminal justice below the level
of the Supreme Court of the United States is solidly massed against the criminal suspect.
Only a few appellate judges can throw off the fetters of their middle-class backgrounds...
and identify with the criminal suspect instead of with the policeman or with the putative
victim of the suspect's theft, mugging, rape or murder. Trial judges still more, and magis-
trates beyond belief, are functionally and psychologically allied with the police, their co-
workers in the unending and scarifying work of bringing criminals to book.
These trial judges and magistrates are the human beings that must find the "facts"
when cases involving suspects' rights go into court .... Their factual findings resolve the
inevitable conflict between the testimony of the police and the testimony of the suspect-
usually a down-and-outer or a bad type, and often a man with a record. The result is about
what one would expect.
Amsterdam, supra note 94, at 792.
"See Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 523 (1975) (commenting that "[o]ne devising
institutions for Utopia would not likely delegate so large a responsibility for maintain-
ing the integrity of the criminal justice process to the courts").
' See, e.g., Stuntz, supra note 69, at 21 (arguing inter alia that criminal procedure's
regulatory regime is incomplete).
[Vol. 90
BOOK REVIEW
B. A CRIQUE OF PIZZI'S PRESCRIPIMVE CLAIMS
Professor Pizzi offers a variety of reform measures to pro-
mote the truth-seeking function of the trial process. As an ini-
tial matter, he argues that the nature of police investigation
must be fundamentally transformed so that police can carry out
thorough and complete investigations in a non-adversarial
manner (pp. 62-67). To that end, he suggests that officers
should be encouraged to view their role as independent from
the prosecution of the case, although he fails to explain pre-
cisely how this is to occur (pp. 222-23). A second set of propos-
als appears to be aimed at strengthening the role of the trial
judge. Professor Pizzi advocates granting the trial judges more
authority to control the trial process, and to develop cases sub-
stantively (p. 222). With the increase injudicial authority, Pro-
fessor Pizzi offers a corresponding reduction in the role of
laypersons (i.e., jurors) in the trial process (pp. 224-25). Spe-
cifically, he argues that all-layperson juries should be used only
in the less serious cases, whereas the more serious cases should
be tried before mixed panels ofjudges and jurors (pp. 224, 226-
28). Finally, Professor Pizzi suggests that trial procedures and
evidentiary rules should be relaxed so that legal actors can pur-
sue the "truth" more freely (p. 224).
Each of Professor Pizzi's reform measures is perhaps meri-
torious in the abstract, but proves immensely problematic when
viewed against the backdrop of the moral crisis of legitimacy
within the criminal justice system. The dominant feature of
Professor Pizzi's reform measures is the aggregation of power
within legal actors and institutions to enable more "complete"
investigations and more accurate guilt determinations. But for
Professor Pizzi's reform to work, the American people must be
convinced that these legal actors and institutions will not betray
their trust. In this sense, his reform presupposes (and depends
upon) substantial trust by members of the community that legal
institutions will render "truthful" determinations. Problems
arise, however, because it is not at all clear that such trust actu-
ally exists. Furthermore, recent incidents of police brutality, ra-
cial profiling, and the abuse of prosecutorial discretion suggest
that betrayal and illegitimacy continue to plague the criminal
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justice system. In light of ongoing concerns about legitimacy of
the criminal process, it is not entirely clear that Professor Pizzi's
reform proposals would promote "truth." One might argue that
such proposals are equally likely to promote abuses, which
would exacerbate rather than improve perceptions of the
criminal trial process as illegitimate and inconsistent with
democratic principle.
The ongoing crisis of legitimacy in the criminal process is
sustained in large part by a perception that something must be
amiss within a criminal process that, despite its purportedly
strong orientation towards fairness and equality, proves so dis-
proportionately harmful to minority and indigent defendants.
In No EqualJustice, Professor David Cole combines statistics from
a variety of sources that highlight the disparity in punishment
received by African American offenders vis4-vis their white
counterparts. 98 Perhaps most startling is his collection of data
on the enforcement of drug laws. Under current federal law, a
person charged with a crack-related offense faces a sentence 100
times harsher than a person charged with a similar crime involv-
ing powder cocaine.9 In 1992, an estimated 65% of all crack
users were white.10° However, in that same year, 92.6% of those
convicted for federal crimes involving crack cocaine were Afri-
can-American-only 4.7% were white.' O' Cole also highlights a
1992 survey by the United States Sentencing Commission, which
found that, in seventeen states, not a single white person had
been prosecuted on federal crack cocaine charges.' Cole also
draws attention to disparities in punishment meted out under
state laws that provide for the imposition of life sentence upon
conviction of a second or third felony offense. A Georgia sen-
tencing law provides that a defendant convicted of a second
drug offense may, at the request of the district attorney, receive
See DAVID COLE, No EQUALJUSTCE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMECAN CRIMNAL
JuSTicE SYSTEM 132-53 (1999).
"As Cole points out, "a small-time crack 'retailer' caught selling 5 grams of crack
receives the same prison sentence as a large-scale powder cocaine dealer convicted of






a sentence of lifetime incarceration. °3 According to Cole, in
1995, 98.4% of those persons serving life sentences under the
provision were African-American.' T Similarly, African-Americans
are sentenced under California's three-strikes law at a rate 13.3
times that for whites.'05
One might be inclined to question the legitimacy of the
process based upon these statistics alone. Yet when considered
in conjunction with the prevalence of police brutality, the pre-
dominance of racial profiling, and the protections afforded to
prosecutorial discretion, there is ample evidence to lead people
to question the legitimacy of the trial process.
The persistence of police brutality powerfully undermines
feelings of trust in law enforcement agencies and reinforces
core perceptions of law enforcement as an essential component
of racial oppression. Professor Pizzi proposes that we relax re-
straints on the ability of the police to investigate crimes in the
field, but recent events suggest that additional constrains are in
order. For example, in June 1999, in two separate incidents,
Chicago Police officers fatally shot two unarmed African-
American motorists.' 6 Four months earlier, New York police of-
ficers fired forty-one rounds in the fatal shooting of Amadou
Diallo, an unarmed suspect, as he stood in the doorway of his
home.0 7 The Diallo shooting resulted in severe popular back-
lash against New York police practices.' 8 The initial insensitivity
10 Id. at 143
104 See id.
5 See id. at 148.
'06 Todd Lighty & Gary Marx, Questions, Protest Clouds Cop Shootings, Cn. TRM.,June
8, 1999, at B1.
107 On February 4, 1999, four white New York City police officers, members of a
Bronx street crimes unit, shot and killed Amadou Diallo, a 22-year-old unarmed West
African immigrant street peddler, who had no criminal record, in a "ferocious bar-
rage" of 41 bullets in the vestibule of his apartment building in the Bronx borough of
New York City. Robert D. McFadden & Kit R. Roane, U.S. Examining KilMng of Man in
Police Volley, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1999, at Al. Diallo suffered 19 gunshot wounds. See
id.
'08 See, e.g., Dan Barry & Majorie Connelly, Poll in New York Finds Many Think Police
Are Biased, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1999, at Al (reporting on poll results in wake of Diallo
killing, showing widespread concern about racial discrimination in policing); Jodi
Wilgoren & Ginger Thompson, Ajfer Shooting, an Eroding Trust in the Police, N.Y. TIM.S,
Feb. 19, 1999, at Al (reporting on widespread resentment of young minority New
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expressed by New York public officials only fueled further re-
sentment.1' 9 Not surprisingly, the ultimate acquittal of the offi-
cers for the Diallo shooting was perceived by many observers as
injustice heaped upon injustice."'
The current crisis of corruption in law enforcement in Los
Angeles, California further undermines public confidence in
the legitimacy of the administration of criminal justice, and
militates against further expansion of investigatory authority of
police officers. In what some commentators have described as
"the worst [police scandal] in [Los Angeles] history,""' investi-
gators have uncovered scores of allegations of unjustified shoot-
ings, beatings, evidence planting, false arrests, and perjury."
2
Rumors of widespread corruption were first substantiated by the
testimony of former LAPD officer Rafael Perez, who provided
authorities with information as part of a plea bargain to obtain a
lesser sentence on cocaine theft charges."8 In the first of many
startling revelations, ex-officer Perez admitted to shooting a
handcuffed suspect in the head, planting a rifle next to the
fallen body, and fabricating a police report that identified the
suspect as the armed agressor" 4 Nineteen year-old Javier Fran-
cisco Ovando, paralyzed by the gunshot wound, was convicted
and sentenced to twenty-three years in prison based in large
part upon Perez' perjured testimony. 5 Ovando's conviction
Yorkers regarding apparently race-based police stops in the wake of four white police
officers' shooting of Amadou Diallo).
" See Dan Barry, Giuliani Says Diallo Shooting Coverage Skewed Poll, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
17, 1999, at B3 (quoting NewYork City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani complaining that the
public and media have overreacted to police killing of Amadou Diallo, and noting
that since Diallo's killing, there have been 60 other murders in New York that have
not received the same attention).
"o See Robert D. McFadden, Verdict Bares Sharp Feelings on Both Sides, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2000, at Al.
. Henry Weinstein & Jim Newton, T- RAMPART SCANDAL Civil ights Lawyers
Form a Gathering StormforL.A., L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2000, at Al.
112 Id.
"' Scott Glover & Matt Lait, 4 Officers Back Tales of Parties After Shootings, LA. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2000, at Al.
"4Joseph Trevino & Anne-Marie O'Connor, Sooner or Later the Truth Will Come Out,




was voided and he was released from prison following Perez'
disclosure.y6
In addition to his own criminal acts, Rafael Perez revealed
to investigators that he helped cover up three additional unjus-
tified shootings, and knew of at least five others in which his fel-
low officers and their supervisors tainted crime scene evidence
in order to conceal their mistakes.1 Since September 1999,
when the scandal broke, over thirty-two convictions have been
overturned because of corrupt investigations. 8 At least seventy
LAPD officers are currently under investigation for either
committing crimes or assisting other officers in their cover-up
efforts." 9 In a revealing statement, United States Attorney Ale-
jandro Mayorkas, who is currently leading the federal investiga-
tion into the local scandal, described the corruption and civil
rights violations as "tear[ing] at the foundation of not only our
law enforcement community, but of our civil society as a
whole." Cast against the backdrop of such rampant abuses,
one might view Pizzi's proposal to increase police discretion and
broaden investigatory authority with a substantially elevated de-
gree of skepticism.
Professor Pizzi also recommends that we allow police to
question suspects in the absence of lawyers, but one cannot help
but question such a proposal in light of the torture of Abner
Louima at a Brooklyn police station.' Press accounts of the sta-
116 See id,
17 Matt Lait & Scott Glover, Shooting Scenes Were Doctored, Perez Says LAPD, LA.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2000, at Al. In one of these cases, Perez and fellow LAPD officers in-
tentionally delayed calling an ambulance while they planted a gun near a suspect they
had shot and agreed upon a story. The suspect, twenty-one year old Juan Saldana ul-
timately died from his wound. SeeWeinstein & Newton, supra note 111.
.. Matt Lait, Scott Glover & Tina Daunt, Scandal Could Taint Hundreds of Convic-
tions, LATwEs, Feb. 17, 2000, atAl.
"9Id.
"' Matt Lait & Scott Glover, FBI Launches Probe Into Rampart Scanda L.A.Tum,
Feb. 24, 2000, at Al. The exposure of corruption and brutality is expected to gener-
ate scores of civil law suits, costing the city of Los Angeles hundreds of millions of dol-
lars. See Shirley Leung, Los Angeles Looks for Ways to Pay Claims Arising From Police
Scanda Tam WALL STRErJOuRNAL, Mar. 3, 2000, at B4 (estimating liability payouts at
between $125 million and $1 billion).
"2 See David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1997, at B1 (stating that police officers at a Brooklyn police sta-
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tionhouse encounter were stunning: "according to Louima, he
was strip-searched at the duty sergeant's desk and then walked
to the bathroom, where he was sodomized in the anus and
mouth. 'One [police officer] said, 'You niggers have to learn to
respect police officers ... .""12 Given that such clear abuses of
discretion continue to occur under a regime that purportedly
constrains such conduct, there seems little justification to grant
additional authority to police officers.
The prevailing practice of racial profiling by law enforce-
ment agencies likewise proves a powerful catalyst for community
skepticism regarding the legitimacy of police practices. The
lawsuit and eventual settlement of a case against the Maryland
State Troopers is instructive on this point. According to com-
puter data collected by Maryland State Troopers, African-
American motorists, who comprised about 17% of motorists
along the Interstate 95 corridor comprised more than 70% of
the people stopped between 1995 and 1997.22 For nearly a dec-
ade, trial and appellate courts have permitted local law en-
forcement agencies to consider a person's race as an element of
criminal suspicion, provided that race is one of several factors
considered.2 4 Recent efforts to broaden the authority of law en-
tionhouse had beaten and shoved the wooden handle of a toilet plunger into the rec-
tum of a Haitian immigrant who had been arrested for disorderly conduct, obstruct-
ing governmental administration, and resisting arrest and stating that some
community leaders and minority residents [of the New York City area] have long
complained of misconduct and brutality by police officers in minority neighbor-
hoods).
" Michael Claffey et al., Cop Nabbed in Torture Case: Sgts. Grilled About Assault, DAELY
NwS (N.Y.), Aug. 14, 1997, at A3.
" See Katheryn K Russell, "Driving While Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral
Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717, 727 (1999); see also David A. Harris, The Stories, the
Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black" Still Matte, 84 MINN. L REv. 265
(1999); David A. Harris, "Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic Offenses: The Supreme
Court and Pretextual TrafficStops, 87J. CRium. L & CRIMINOLOGY 544,563-566 (1997).
See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (permitting race
as an element of suspicion in border patrol stops); United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d
391 (8th Cir. 1992) (permitting airline security to use race as an element of criminal
suspicion for narcotics trafficking); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425 (Ariz. 1975) (author-
izing use of race as an element of suspicion to justify stop of Mexican male in pre-
dominantly white, middle to upper-middle class neighborhood).
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forcement officials to use race as an element of suspicion'2s have
led one scholar to remark that "[today, police departments
across the nation . . . continue to target blacks in a manner
reminiscent of the slave patrols of colonial America."
126
The prosecutor's charging decision-the decision of which
crimes and persons to charge-remains controversial in large
part because it remains highly discretionary and largely insu-
lated from legal challenge. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins,'2 the Court
prohibited selective prosecution on racial lines. The Court pro-
claimed:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appear-
ance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an
evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal
discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to
their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of
the Constitution.
2 8
Although acknowledging that this principle remains in ef-
fect, the Court's ruling in United States v. Armstron?2 makes it
'2 Modem efforts of this sort were first given tacit approval by the Supreme Court
in WMren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772-73 (1996), a decision involving a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a possible racial profiling in routine traffic stops. The
Court's holding that existing Fourth Amendment doctrine "foreclose[d] any argu-
ment that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved," see id. at 1774, was interpreted by
most to mean that traffic stops motivated by racial prejudice of the officers do not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment provided that there are other, non-racial reasons for
making the stop. For additional discussion of the import of the Whren decision, see
David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1997 Sip. Cr. REv. 271 (1998), and AngelaJ. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops,
51 U. MIAM L. Rv. 425 (1997).
Recently, in City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), .the Supreme Court
struck down an anti-loitering statute that afforded police officers exceptionally broad
power to disperse any group of two or more people standing in public if the police
suspect that the group includes a gang member. As one commentator observed,
"[d]uring the three years the law was in effect, it yielded arrests of more than 40,000
citizens, most of whom were Black or Latino residents of inner-city neighborhoods."
Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-
Maintenance Policng, 89J. CpiM. L AND CRIMNOLOGY 775, 775-76 (1999).
InTracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 336 (1998).
" 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
Id. at 373-74.
517 U.S. 456 (1996)
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nearly impossible to prove a claim of selective prosecution on
the prohibited ground of race.
In Armstrong, the defendant argued that his prosecution in
federal as opposed to state court for possession of crack cocaine
was motivated on racial grounds.ss In support of his claim, the
defendant presented evidence that African-Americans arrested
for crack cocaine possession were handed over to federal
authorities for prosecution and punishment pursuant to the
tough sentencing guidelines that now control the discretion of
district judges, while white suspects, arrested for the same of-
fense, were directed into the more lenient state court system.' 1
The Court declared that the prosecutor enjoys a strong pre-
sumption that its charging decisions are not motivated by racial
animus, and found that Armstrong's evidence was insufficient to
rebut that presumption.'32 The Court's ruling makes clear that
selective prosecution claims, though theoretically possible to
raise, are virtually impossible to win.
Examples of prosecutorial misconduct in connection with
death penalty cases only raise further questions of the legitimacy
of the criminal justice regime. Just last year, citizens of Illinois
learned that several innocent people-most of them members
of racial minorities-had served many years on death row be-
fore the efforts of journalism students at Northwestern Univer-
sity uncovered evidence that led to their release. s As one
commentator observed, "[p]erhaps the most shocking dimen-
sion of this story is the alleged complicity of prosecutors in the
a'0IdL at 458-59.
Id at 459-60.1-2 Id. at 465, 470.
" See Douglas Holt & Flynn McRoberts, Porter FuUy Savors 1st Taste of Freedom;Judge
Releases Man Once Set for Execution, Cm-. TRm., Feb. 6, 1999, at Al (reporting release of
death row inmate Anthony Porter after journalism students at Northwestern Univer-
sity produced evidence of his factual innocence, including recantations of witness tes-
timony that Chicago police claimed connected Porter to fatal shootings in 1982, and
a videotaped statement by Alstory Simon, implicating himself in the murders for
which Porter had been convicted, ending nearly 17 years of imprisonment, which in-
cluded an execution date stayed only two days before Porter was to die); Lawrence C.
Marshall, Innocence and Death; Lessons the State Must Heed Before It Kills Again, CI. TRm.,




knowing use of perjured testimony and refusal to disclose ex-
culpatory evidence to the defense."M When viewed in conjunc-
tion with the Court's decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, which held
that the imposition of the death penalty was constitutional de-
spite evidence of a pattern of discrimination,'3T one cannot help
but conclude that there is an ongoing crisis of moral legitimacy
within the prosecutorial ranks. 8
The central problem with Professor Pizzi's recommenda-
tions for reform, then, is that he presupposes a level of legiti-
macy currently not enjoyed by the system. To promote "truth"
within the criminal process, one must first secure a level of le-
gitimacy for that process so that "truth" discovered by legal ac-
tors and acted upon by legal institutions is perceived as truth. In
avoiding the legitimacy question, Professor Pizzi's reform pro-
posals seem to raise more questions than they answer-the most
difficult being, "why should we embrace reform that seeks to
aggregate authority in the hands of institutional actors whose
conduct is increasingly being called into question?" Pizzi may
have a response-some explanation as to how his proposal
meets the peculiar challenges of the American context while
simultaneously enhancing the "truth-seeking" function of the
trial process. But that response does not appear in Trials With-
out Truth, and in the absence of some compelling explanation,
'" Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Book Review, Removing the Blindfold From LadyJus-
tice, 88 GEO. L.J. 115, 132 & n.128 (1999) (reviewing COLE, supra note 98). Indeed,
investigative efforts into death penalty procedures in Illinois recently revealed, in the
words of Illinois Governor George Ryan, such a "shameful record of convicting inno-
cent people and putting them on Death Row" that the Governor declared a morato-
rium on all executions in that state. Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Ryan Suspends
Death Peiln--Illinois First State to Impose Moratorium on Executions, Cm. TRM., Jan. 31,
2000, at Al. In the wake of the Illinois moratorium, a number of other states-in-
cluding New Hampshire, Nebraska, Maryland, and Indiana-have raised questions
about their own procedures for handling death penalty cases. See Stevenson Swanson,
New Hampshire Bill Would Repeal Death Penalty-House Passes the Measure, But Governor
Pledges to Veto It Cm. TRm., May 11, 2000, at Al.
.. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). Interestingly, the author of the bare majority decision, Jus-
tice Powell, later told his biographer that McCleskey was the biggest mistake in his ca-
reer and that if he had to do it over again, he would rule the death penalty
unconstitutional. SeeJoHN C. JEFFRMS, JR., JusncE LE s F. POWELL, j-: A BIOGRAPHY
451 (1994).
x' For an interesting discussion of racial disparity in punishment, see generally
COLE, supra note 98.
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there seems little reason to embrace his recommendations for
reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
Trials Without Truth serves as an important reminder that all
is not well within our system of criminal justice. It attempts to
lay bare the American trial process so that we all might take a
serious look at the way criminal justice is administered in this
country. One might dispute whether improvement means refo-
cusing the trial process by placing "truth-seeking" at the center,
and structuring our trial system accordingly. But the urgency
with which Professor Pizzi speaks should encourage us all to
look Closely at where the criminal process appears to fail us, and
contemplate ways in which it might be improved.
